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Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

10/549,542

Applicant(s)

ROSTIN ET AL.

Examiner

VIRGINIA HO

Art Unit

2432

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --
Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 22 June 2009.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-40 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-40 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SF/ICE)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application
- 6) ☐ Other: _____

DETAILED ACTION

Response to Amendment

1. This action is in response to the request for reconsideration filed June 22, 2009.
2. Examiner notes that applicant's remarks, page 2, recites "In this response, Applicants traverse the §103(a) rejections, and ***amend independent claims 1 and 35-40.***" However, no amended claims were filed.
3. Applicant's arguments, with respect to the claims, have been considered but they are not persuasive.

Response to Arguments

4. Applicant's arguments, see pages 2-5, filed June 22, 2009, with respect to the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

Applicant asserts that the modification of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm would be inappropriate as one of ordinary skill would not be motivated to modify Diffie-Hellman to incorporate the encryption of the transformed second signal, as it would needlessly complicate the algorithm for no additional benefit. Additionally, there would be no need to execute Diffie-Hellman if both parties already have such a key as the purpose of the algorithm is to generate a secure cipher key known to both parties. As such, Applicant traverses the taking of Official Notice that it would be obvious to encrypt values exchanged in a key exchange protocol.

However, Examiner respectfully disagrees. Applicant is directed to Boyko et al. (*Provably Secure Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Diffie-Hellman*, 2000) (*hereinafter Boyko*). Boyko teaches "Two entities, who only share a password, and who are

communicating over an insecure network, want to authenticate each other and agree on a large session key to be used for protecting their subsequent communication” (*page 1, Introduction*). In particular, Boyko discusses the notion of an EKE (Exponential key exchange) protocol based on the idea of using a password (known to both parties) to encrypt protocol messages of a standard key exchange (e.g., Diffie-Hellman) (*pages 158-159, Section 2*). Additionally, while Diffie-Hellman comprises inherent security measures in the fact that the strings exchanged may be infeasible to invert, the conventional Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks due to the lack of authentication. Password-authenticated key exchange protocols seek to combine authentication with key agreement in order to provide increased security. Thus, Examiner maintains that it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to encrypt values communicated during a key agreement/exchange protocol and that doing so would indeed increase security.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103

5. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

6. Claims 1, 2, 5-6, 13, 19, and 35-40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks et al. (*US Patent No. 7,298,851*) (*hereinafter Hendricks*).

As per claims 1, 5-6, 13, and 35-40, Hendricks teaches the method comprising: a seed generation server providing a first string to a seed generation client; the seed generation client

generating a second string, and sending the second string to the seed generation server; the seed generation client generating the seed as a function of at least the first string and the second string; and the seed generation server independently generating the seed as a function of at least the first string and the second string (column 42, lines 1-15, Hendricks teaches a method wherein a seed key is independently generated by both the sender and recipient after negotiation information is exchanged using a key exchange algorithm such as Diffie-Hellman, exemplified in US Patent 4,200,770. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange comprises the sender and receiver each generating a string, which is sent to the other party. Upon receipt of the string, both the sender and receiver are able to independently generate a random value, the seed key, as a function of at least the first and second strings.).

Hendricks does not explicitly teach the method wherein the second string is encrypted before being sent to the seed generation server. However, Examiner takes OFFICIAL NOTICE that it would have been well known and obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to encrypt values communicated during a key agreement/exchange protocol in order to provide secure key generation. As such, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to encrypt the second string with a public key of the seed generation server or alternatively, to encrypt the second string with a secret key shared by the seed generation client and the seed generation server.

Additionally, Hendricks teaches the method and apparatus wherein the seed generation client is associated with a first processing device and the seed generation server is associated with a second processing device (column 21, lines 18-20, the home system which serves as the recipient comprises of a processor and memory; column 9, lines 9-10, the operations center

which serves as the sender comprises of a processor coupled to a memory). Similarly, Hendricks teaches a machine-readable storage medium containing one or more software programs for secure generation of a seed (*column 63, lines 9-11, security related activities may be done in software using a standard processor*).

As per claim 2, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1 as applied above.

Hendricks does not explicitly teach the method wherein the seed comprises a symmetric key. However, Hendricks teaches a method of generating a seed using a key exchange/agreement algorithm (*column 31, lines 51-67, a seed key is generated by using a key exchange algorithm such as the Diff-Hellman key exchange algorithm.*). As such, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to utilize the same seed key generation method taught by Hendricks to create a symmetric key as both a seed and a key simply comprise of a random value. One would have been motivated to do so as it is clear that Hendricks teaches that the structure of the seed and the symmetric key may be equivalent.

As per claim 19, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, as applied above. Hendricks additionally teaches the method wherein the second string comprises a combination of at least two component strings, including at least a first component generated in the seed generation client by interaction with the seed generation server and a second component previously stored in the seed generation client (*The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm, which is incorporated by reference in Hendricks, teaches each party independently generating the random value, the seed key, using the exchanged two values, in addition to two previously stored values, q and a. See column 4, lines 11-13 of Patent No. 4,200,770*).

7. Claim 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Fielder et al. (*US Patent No. 5963646*) (hereinafter Fielder).

As per claim 15, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, as applied above.

Hendricks does not teach the method wherein the server initiates the seed generation process responsive to receipt of a command.

However, Fielder teaches the method wherein the seed generation server initiates the seed generation process responsive to receipt of a command (*column 3, lines 22-33, a seed is generated and applied through a hash function to provide the key; column 7, lines 38-40, an activation code initiates the generation of this process*).

It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teachings of Hendricks with Fielder in order to initiate generation of a seed based upon receipt of a command. One would have been motivated to do so as this would allow the party that submits the command to direct the generation of the seed as needed, giving an increased level of control which allows the seed generation process to be “automated” and efficient.

8. Claims 3, 4, and 29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Burnett et al. (*2001*) (hereinafter Burnett).

As per claims 3 and 4, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1 as applied above.

Hendricks does not explicitly teach the method wherein the seed is generated as a function of a combination of the second string and identifying information associated with the seed generation server.

However, Burnett teaches the method wherein the seed is generated as a function of a combination of the second string and identifying information associated with the seed generation server (pp. 249, Burnett describes a version of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement in which the recipient's public key is combined with the sender's private key to generate a shared key). Burnett describes how the public key infrastructure provides a mechanism by which a public key is bound to a user in such a manner as to properly authenticate the user's identity (pp. 171-172). In doing so, the tamperproof binding of the public key to the user allows one to be able to securely rely upon the public key to identify the user who possesses it.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention that the recipient who contributes a public key in the Diffie-Hellman key agreement may be the server, and that the identifying information associated with the server comprises a public key of the server. Additionally, it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of Hendricks with that of Burnett in order to generate a seed as a function of a second string and one or more of a first string and identifying information associated with a seed generation server so as to provide a manner of authenticating the seed generated by a server through interaction with a client. Doing so would ensure that the generation of the seed is more secure, as the server is guaranteed to have been associated with the generation process.

As per claim 29, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1 as applied above. Hendricks does not explicitly teach the method wherein the generated seed is used to replace an existing seed known to both the seed generation client and the seed generation server.

However, Burnett teaches that pseudo-random number generators are deterministic, such that changing the seed would change the outputted pseudo-random number. Additionally,

Burnett teaches that unlike true random number generators, whose input is constantly changing on its own on a random basis, it is important for the user to ensure that the input (the seed) to a pseudo-random number generator to change each time you want to generate a new number to serve as an encryption key (*pp.* 28). Burnett describes how key management protocols support the function of key updates, through which key pairs used in an asymmetric cryptography system must be updated regularly by replacing key pairs with new ones (*pp.* 183).

Therefore, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teachings of Hendricks with Burnett in order to randomly generate new seeds to replace existing seeds, which can then be used as input to key generators to produce new encryption keys. One would have been motivated to do so, as seeds are used as inputs to pseudo-random number generators to produce long strings that may be used as encryption keys, and changing encryption keys on a regular basis provides increased security against brute-force attacks; in the case of encryption keys which are generated from deterministic pseudo-random generators, it is necessary for the input (the seed) to be changed in order to generate new keys which may then replace old keys.

9. Claims 20-21, and 25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Fielder and further in view of Burnett.

As per claim 20, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, as applied above.

Hendricks does not teach the method wherein the seed is generated by applying a cryptographic algorithm to an additional string generated utilizing the first string, the second string, and the key.

However, Fielder teaches the method wherein the seed is generated by applying a cryptographic algorithm to an additional string generated utilizing the first string, the second string, and the key (column 3, lines 50-52, *the first string, a constant value, may combined with a second string, the E-Key seed, through a sequence of cryptographic steps to provide an input (seed) to a secure hash function; column 3, lines 53-55, the E-Key seed and constant value may be encrypted*).

It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teachings of Hendricks with that of Fielder in order apply a block cipher with a feedback mode by repeatedly apply the cryptographic algorithm to successive portions of the additional string.

One would have been motivated to do so as a block cipher comprises one type of symmetric key algorithm and utilizing a feedback mode solves the problem of copies of ciphertext resulting from applying a block cipher, which an attacker might identify as a repeated pattern (*Burnett, pp. 40*). By repeatedly applying the algorithm to portions of the additional string, the seed appears more random, and therefore becomes more resistant to attacks.

As per claim 21, Hendricks, Fielder, and Burnett teach the method of claim 20 as applied above. Additionally, Fielder further teaches the method wherein the additional string generated utilizing the first string, the second string and the key comprises a concatenation of the first string, the second string, and the key (column 3, lines 49-52, *a constant value, the first string, may be combined with the E-Key seed, the second string, through a sequence of logic, algebraic, and/or cryptographic steps*). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to concatenate the first string, the second string, and the key prior to

applying a cryptographic algorithm to the generated string in order to produce a seed, as concatenation is one of the simplest methods of combining two bit sequences.

As per claim 25, Hendricks, Fielder, and Burnett teach the method of claim 20 as applied above. Additionally, Fielder teaches the method wherein the cryptographic algorithm comprises an encryption operation (*column 2, lines 23-25, encryption algorithms are required to generate an encryption key, which may be used as a seed, as stated earlier*).

10. Claims 16-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Saito et al. (*US Patent No. 6125186*) (hereinafter Saito).

As per claim 16, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, but does not teach the method wherein the seed generation server initiates the seed generation process responsive to receipt of a request initiated by the seed generation client.

However, Saito teaches a server establishing an encrypted communication path after receiving a message from the client (*Figure 4A, client sends notice of start-up completion*), which is followed by the actual encryption and decryption processing to be performed.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teaching of Hendricks with Saito, in order for the server to initiate the seed generation process responsive to receipt of a request by the client, as it is necessary to establish an encrypted communication path before any processes may be initiated. For cryptographic protocols, it is important to change the key needed for encryption in order to increase security (*column 3, lines 28-30*). In addition, for protocols utilizing deterministic keys which can be independently generated, changing a key produced by a pseudo-random number generator

necessitates changing the seed used for input. Therefore, optimally secure cryptographic protocols would generate a new session key (and therefore a new seed) upon the establishment of a new connection between the server and client.

As per claim 17, Hendricks and Saito teach the method of claim 16 as applied above. Saito further teaches the method of generating a seed in which the seed generation client provides the seed generation server with information indicating one or more processing algorithms suitable for use in the seed generation process (column 6, lines 18-21; *an instruction signal is sent which indicates which cryptographic processing unit corresponding to a particular algorithm is to be used*).

11. Claims 7-8, 11-12, 14, and 28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Kaliski, Jr. (*US Pre-Grant Publication 2001/0055388*) (hereinafter Kaliski).

As per claim 7, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, but does not teach the method wherein the seed generation client comprises or is otherwise associated with an authentication token.

However, Kaliski teaches (*paragraph [0006-0007], private data may be stored on a token that is physically connected to a client*) a client which is connected to an authentication token.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teaching of Hendricks with Kaliski in order to associate a seed generation client with an authentication token so as to provide a device which may hold private data which

combined with other data may generate a seed. One would have been motivated to do so as utilizing a token allows for a more secure generation protocol, resulting in an attacker having less opportunity to attempt to steal the private data used by the client, as data on a token is only accessible when connected to a client. Should an attacker compromise a client, they may not necessarily gain access to the private data since it is not stored on the client itself, but rather on a token.

As per claim 8, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, but does not teach the method wherein the seed generation server comprises or is otherwise associated with an authentication entity.

However, Kaliski teaches (*paragraph [0019], Kaliski teaches the use of verification servers, which may or may not also be the servers together with a client generate a strong secret, which may be used as a seed*) a server which comprises or is otherwise associated with an authentication entity. Kaliski describes verification servers which provide authentication of the regenerated strong secret.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teaching of Hendricks with that of Kaliski in order to associate a seed generation server with an authentication entity so as to provide a mechanism for authentication of a generated seed created by deterministic means (*paragraph [0019], Kaliski describes how authentication could help determine if an unauthorized entity is attempting to regenerate the strong secret*). One would have been motivated to do so as an authenticated seed provides for a more secure seed generation and consequently key generation.

As per claim 11, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, but does not teach the method wherein the seed generation server sends the generated seed to an authentication entity.

However, Kaliski teaches (*paragraph [0019], Kaliski teaches the use of verification servers, which may or may not also be the servers together with a client generate a strong secret, which may be used as a seed*) a server which comprises or is otherwise associated with an authentication entity. Kaliski describes verification servers which provide authentication of the regenerated strong secret.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teaching of Hendricks with that of Kaliski in order to send a generated seed to an authentication entity, so as to provide a mechanism for authentication of a generated seed created by deterministic means (*paragraph [0019], Kaliski describes how authentication could help determine if an unauthorized entity is attempting to regenerate the strong secret*). One would have been motivated to do so as an authenticated seed provides for a more secure seed generation and consequently key generation. In addition, in the case where the authentication entity may not be the same as the seed generation server, it is clear that there needs to be a way for the server to send the generated seed to the authentication entity to perform appropriate authentication.

As per claim 12, Hendricks and Kaliski teach the method of claim 11 as applied above. Kaliski further teaches the method wherein the seed generation server also sends user identifying information associated with the seed to the authentication entity. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to send user identifying information associated with the data to be authenticated. In doing so, one would be able to determine if the

seed was regenerated by the appropriate entities by checking the regenerated seed against a database or other entity that has bound the seed with an identity, as is done in public key infrastructure.

As per claim 14, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, but does not teach the method wherein the seed generation client and the seed generation server communicate with one another through at least one intermediary processing device.

However, Kaliski teaches the method wherein the client in concert with an intermediary processing device provides a string to be used to generate a strong secret (*paragraph [0054], a generating client takes data stored in a token, the intermediary processing device, in order to generate a weak secret, which is then combined with a server's string in order to produce a strong secret*). It is clear that a token may communicate with a server via an intermediary processing device, such as a client, which is able to read the data stored on a token.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in that art at the time of the invention to combine the teaching of Hendricks with Kaliski in order for a seed generation client and server to communicate through an intermediary device so as to provide for a more secure generation protocol, as an attacker has less opportunity to attempt to steal the private data used by the client, as data on a token is only accessible when connected to a client. Should an attacker compromise a client, they may not necessarily gain access to the private data since it is not stored on the client itself, but rather on a token.

As per claim 28, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, but does not teach the method wherein the seed generation server stores the generated seed in an authentication entity.

However, Kaliski teaches (*paragraph [0019], Kaliski teaches the use of verification servers, which may or may not also be the servers together with a client generate a strong secret, which may be used as a seed*) a server which comprises or is otherwise associated with an authentication entity. Kaliski describes verification servers which provide authentication of the regenerated strong secret.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teaching of Hendricks with that of Kaliski in order to store the generated seed in an authentication entity so as to provide a mechanism for authentication of a generated seed created by deterministic means (*paragraph [0019], Kaliski describes how authentication could help determine if an unauthorized entity is attempting to regenerate the strong secret*). One would have been motivated to do so as an authenticated seed provides for a more secure seed generation and consequently key generation.

In addition, in the case where the authentication entity may not be the same as the seed generation server, it is clear that there needs to be a way for the server to send the generated seed to the authentication entity to perform appropriate authentication. Kaliski teaches that the server may store the generated seed in an authentication entity (*paragraph [0016], Kaliski describes how the verification server[s] may store verifier data*). Once the generated seed is sent to the authentication entity, the entity will be able to determine if the identity may be verified by referring to some record previously stored in the authentication entity that has evidence of the seed bound to a user, similar to the authentication of public keys in PKI.

12. Claims 9 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Yatsukawa (*US Patent No. 61480404*).

As per claim 9, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, but does not teach the method wherein the seed generation server sends an authentication code to the seed generation client, the authentication code proving knowledge of the generated seed and instructing the seed generation client to store the generated seed.

However, Yatsukawa teaches the method wherein the client stores the generated seed upon receipt of an authentication code by the server (*Figure 13, the client stores authentication data D_2 upon receiving a message of "grant" indicating the authentication processing result from the server*). Notification of grant of the authentication request received from the authentication server assures that both the server's knowledge of the generated authentication data matches that of the client (*column 13, lines 23-29*).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the teaching of Hendricks with Yatsukawa in order send an authentication code which proves knowledge of a generated seed and instructs a client to store said seed, so as to ensure that the appropriate seed is stored by the client. Such an authentication method would make it difficult for an unauthorized entity to replace the seed which was securely generated with a false seed right before it is stored.

As per claim 27, Hendricks teaches the method of claim 1, but does not teach the method wherein the seed generation client stores the generated seed in an authentication token.

However, Yatsukawa teaches the client storing a seed (*Figure 13, the client stores seed data used for generating authentication data*). Yatsukawa also teaches a client which is associated with an authentication token (*Figure 5*).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teaching of Hendricks with Yatsukawa in order to store a generated seed in an authentication token, so as to provide increased security in generating a seed, as storing personal data such as the seed within a token allows it to be managed relatively safely and makes “masquerading” by an unauthorized entity in the generation protocol generally difficult (*Yatsukawa, column 9, lines 45-51*).

13. Claims 23-24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Fielder and further in view of Burnett, and further in view of Carro et al. (*US Pre-Grant Publication 2002/0013794*) (hereinafter Carro).

As per claims 23 and 24, Hendricks, Fielder, and Burnett teach the method of claim 20, but do not teach the method wherein the cryptographic algorithm comprises a one-way cryptographic operation.

However, Carro teaches the generating a seed (*Figure 3, a seed is generated from applying a function to a string ‘cText’ with a secret key*) from two strings (a secret-key and a string ‘cText’) through the use of one-way hashing (*paragraph [0026]*).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teachings of Hendricks, Fielder, and Burnett with Carro, in order to generate a seed by applying a one-way hashing algorithm, as one-way hashing provides a mechanism in

which a deterministic value may be generated such that the same seed is not produced from different combinations of strings.

14. Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Yatsukawa, and further in view of Carro.

As per claim 10, Hendricks and Yatsukawa teach the method of claim 9 as applied above, but do not teach the method wherein the authentication code is cryptographically derived from a secret key shared by the seed generation client and the seed generation server.

More specifically, Yatsukawa teaches enciphering seed data by a secret key (*column 11, lines 40-43*) in order to generate an authentication code sent from one party to another in order to provide authentication. The authentication code taught by Yatsukawa was derived from a private key of an asymmetric key pair.

However, Carro teaches that one type of authentication code, known as a MAC, is often computed from a secret key shared only by the sender and receiver (*paragraph [0003]*). It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the teachings of Hendricks and Yatsukawa with Carro in order to cryptographically derive the authentication code from a secret key, rather than a private key associated with the client.

15. Claims 30-34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Burnett, and further in view of Yatsukawa and further in view of Kaliski.

As per claim 30, Hendricks and Burnett teach the method of claim 29, but do not teach the method wherein the generated seed is used to replace an existing seed in an authentication

token associated with the seed generation client and in an authentication entity associated with the seed generation server.

However, Yatsukawa teaches the client storing a seed (*Figure 13, the client stores seed data used for generating authentication data*). Yatsukawa also teaches a client which is associated with an authentication token (*Figure 5*).

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teachings of Hendricks and Burnett with Yatsukawa in order to replace an existing seed in an authentication token and an authentication entity, so as to provide increased security in generating a seed, as storing personal data such as the seed within a token allows it to be managed relatively safely and makes “masquerading” by an unauthorized entity in the generation protocol generally difficult (*Yatsukawa, column 9, lines 45-51*).

Kaliski teaches that the server may store the generated seed in an authentication entity (*paragraph [0016], Kaliski describes how the verification server[s], which provide authentication of the regenerated strong secret, may store verifier data*). Once the generated seed is sent to the authentication entity, the entity will be able to determine if the identity may be verified by referring to some record previously stored in the authentication entity that has evidence of the seed bound to a user, similar to the authentication of public keys in PKI.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teachings of Hendricks, Fielder, Burnett, and Yatsukawa with that of Kaliski in order to provide a mechanism for authentication of a generated seed created by deterministic means (*paragraph [0019], Kaliski describes how authentication could help determine if an unauthorized entity is attempting to regenerate the strong secret*). Additionally, it would have

been obvious to combine the teachings in order to replace an existing seed in an authentication token associated with the seed generation client and in an authentication entity associated with the seed generation server, for increased security, as stated earlier.

As per claim 31, Hendricks, Burnett, Yatsukawa, and Kaliski teach the method of claim 30 as applied above. Yatsukawa further teaches the method wherein the authentication token replaces the existing seed with the generated seed after the receipt of a signal from the authentication entity (*Abstract, upon receiving a grant from the server, which performs authentication, the client stores the data as seed data in place of the first seed data*).

As per claim 32, Hendricks, Burnett, Yatsukawa, and Kaliski teach the method of claim 31 as applied above. Yatsukawa further teaches the method wherein the signal comprises an authentication code cryptographically derived from the seed (*column 11, lines 40-43, Yatsukawa teaches enciphering seed data by a secret key in order to generate authentication data sent from one party to another in order to provide authentication; Figure 13, after comparison of the authentication data, the client/server stores the new seed data in the place of the old one*).

As per claim 33, Hendricks, Burnett, Yatsukawa, and Kaliski teach the method of claim 30 as applied above. Yatsukawa further teaches the method wherein the existing seed is replaced with the generated seed after receipt of a signal. (*Abstract, upon receiving a grant from the server, which performs authentication, the client stores the data as seed data in place of the first seed data*). Yatsukawa teaches replaces the existing seed in a client upon authentication from a server, but does not teach an authentication entity replacing the seed after receipt of a signal from the authentication token.

However, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to utilize two-way authentication, as Kaliski teaches that it is important for source of each message exchanged between server and client to be authenticated in order to maintain the security of the overall protocol (*paragraph [0055]*). Therefore, once the token, or the client associated with the token, authenticates the source of the message from the server, it may then instruct the authentication entity associated with the server to replace the seed.

As per claim 34, Hendricks, Burnett, Yatsukawa, and Kaliski teach the method of claim 33 as applied above. Yatsukawa further teaches the method wherein the signal comprises an authentication code cryptographically derived from the seed (*column 11, lines 40-43, Yatsukawa teaches enciphering seed data by a secret key in order to generate authentication data sent from one party to another in order to provide authentication; Figure 13, after comparison of the authentication data, the client/server stores the new seed data in the place of the old one*).

16. Claims 22 and 26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Fielder and further in view of Burnett, and further in view of Scheidt et al. (*US Pre-Grant Publication 2002/0062451*) (hereinafter Scheidt).

As per claim 22, Hendricks, Fielder, and Burnett teach the method of claim 20 as applied above, but do not specifically teach the method wherein the additional string comprises n portions C[1], C[2],... C[n], and the seed is generated by computing:

I[1]-- Algorithm (C[1], C[2])

I[2] = Algorithm (I[1], C[3])

$I[n-1] = \text{Algorithm}(I[n-2], C[n])$

$\text{seed} = I[n-1]$,

where Algorithm (A, B) denotes application of the cryptographic algorithm to portion B of the string utilizing an algorithm parameter denoted by A.

However, Scheidt teaches the method wherein a working key is constructed from several pieces of information via a combiner function (*paragraph [0056]*). This working key functions similarly to a seed, in that it is used to initialize a symmetric key cryptographic algorithm whereas a seed is used more specifically to initialize a pseudo-random number generator (which comprises of some type of cryptographic algorithm). In addition, the structure of the working key as taught by Scheidt is substantially similar. As such, the method to generate a working key could also be used to generate a seed. Scheidt teaches the working key (which may be used as a seed) generated by applying a combiner function such as Triple DES in CBC Mode (*Figure 5*). CBC Mode is a type of feedback mode. The algorithm claimed in 22 demonstrates a type of block cipher utilizing a type of feedback mode. It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention that rather than using an IV as an algorithm parameter, the algorithm could be applied to the second portion of the string, with the first string functioning as the IV instead. Utilizing the first string as the first parameter eliminates the need to generate a separate value to be used as the IV.

Additionally, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the teachings of Hendricks, Fielder, and Burnett with that of Scheidt, in order to generate a seed using such an algorithm, as utilizing "splits," or components, in the manner taught by Scheidt to generate a working key, may be used similarly with seed generation,

to increase the security of the process, as the seed will not be compromised if one of the entities is compromised. This is important as attackers may discover keys produced using a pseudorandom number generator if the seed is compromised (*Burnett, pp. 34*).

As per claim 26, Hendricks, Fielder, and Burnett teach the method of claim 25 as applied above, but do not specifically teach the method wherein the encryption operation comprises the AES algorithm.

However, Scheidt teaches the method wherein a working key is constructed from several pieces of information via a combiner function (*paragraph [0056]*). This working key functions similarly to a seed, in that it is used to initialize a symmetric key cryptographic algorithm whereas a seed is used more specifically to initialize a pseudo-random number generator (which comprises of some type of cryptographic algorithm). In addition, the structure of the working key as taught by Scheidt is substantially similar. As such, the method to generate a working key could also be used to generate a seed. Scheidt teaches the working key (which may be used as a seed) generated by applying a combiner function such as Triple DES in CBC Mode (*Figure 5*).

It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to generate a seed by repeatedly applying the AES algorithm to an additional string generated utilizing the first string, the second string, and the key, as AES is simply the new standard which was created to replace Triple DES. One would apply AES rather than Triple DES, as AES is more resistant to brute-force attacks and is not as slow. In addition, Scheidt teaches that any other symmetric key algorithm could be substituted for the Triple DES algorithm (*paragraph [0070]*).

It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the teachings of Hendricks, Fielder, and Burnett with that of Scheidt, in order to use an encryption operation such as the AES algorithm, as utilizing “splits,” or components, in the manner taught by Scheidt to generate a working key, may be used similarly with seed generation, in order to increase the security of the process, as the seed will not be compromised if one of the entities is compromised. This is important as attackers may discover keys produced using a pseudorandom number generator if the seed is compromised (*Burnett, pp. 34*).

17. Claim 18 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hendricks in view of Saito, and further in view of Schmeh (2003).

As per claim 18, Hendricks and Saito teach the method of claim 17 as applied above, but do not explicitly teach the method wherein the seed generation server responsive to the information indicating one or more processing algorithms provides to the seed generation client additional information specifying one or more characteristics of the seed generation process.

However, Schmeh teaches that one common property of a protocol is that of negotiation ability, in which two parties may agree on certain parameters (*pp. 168*). It would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teachings of Hendricks and Saito with Schmeh in order for the seed generation server to provide additional information specifying characteristics of the seed generation process. One would have been motivated to do so as utilizing negotiations in a protocol to specify characteristics of the seed generation process would allow for increased flexibility for performing the protocol (*Schmeh, pp. 168*).

Conclusion

18. **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to VIRGINIA HO whose telephone number is 571-270-7309. The examiner can normally be reached on Mon to Thu; 7:30 AM - 5:00 PM (Eastern).

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Gilberto Barron can be reached on 571-272-3799. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system

/VIRGINIA HO/
Examiner, Art Unit 2432

/Gilberto Barron Jr./
Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2432